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1 Introduction 
 
Since the “discovery” of the informal economy (IE) in the beginning of the seventies, many 
stakeholders used to argue that the informal economy was marginal and peripheral and that 
the sector was temporary and that it would disappear once a given country achieved sufficient 
levels of economic growth and modern industrial development (Becker 2004). However, this 
notion that the informal economy will disappear was, over the years approved to be wrong, as 
this sector has, in most developing countries grown over time. At the same time other 
scholars and observers contended that the informal economy was not linked to the formal 
sector or to modern capitalist development, a notion that again, has been proved wrong by the 
existing linkages between these two (informal and formal) economies.  
 
Evidence from the African continent show that the informal economy is a permanent feature 
in countries where incomes and assets are not equitably distributed. Experience shows that in 
countries where there is jobless growth compounded and lopsided income distribution, the 
informal economy does not shrink. Observations currently show that the informal economy is 
continuously increasing in most developing countries, even in rural areas. Estimates show 
that the non-agricultural employment share of the informal workforce is 78% in Africa in 
general, 57% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 45–85% in Asia. With most 
developing countries struggling with formal employment opportunities, self-employment has 
been the second best alternative, and it comprises a greater share of informal employment 
than wage employment. For instance, self-employment represents 70% of informal 
employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (if South Africa is excluded, the share is 81% 1), 62% in 
North Africa, 60% in Latin America and 59% in Asia. As a result, informal wage 
employment in the developing world constitutes 30 to 40% of the informal employment 
outside of agriculture (Becker 2004). 
 
The main objective of this research study is to provide insights into the meaning of the 
informal economy in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by demystifying the concept of IE versus the 
hidden or shadow economy as well as the cash economy. Specifically, and in the context of 
SSA, the research study will: (i) define the IE, (ii) provide an overview of the major causes of 
IE, (iii) provide estimates of the size of the IE; and (iv) analyse the tax and revenue potentials 
of the IE.  
1.1 Defining the informal economy  
 
Although the International Labour Organization (ILO), which is one of the authoritative 
international organizations which has done work on informal economy (IE) defines it broadly 
as referring to “all economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in 
practice –not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” (ILO, 2009: iii), the 
2003 definition by the same organization provides an elaborated definition. The 17th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) ICLS (ILO, 2003) has adopted 
guidelines for defining informal employment as comprising all jobs carried out in informal 
enterprises as well as in formal enterprises by workers, and especially employees,  
 
whose employment relationship is, in law or in practice, not subject to national 
labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain 
employment benefits (advance notice of dismissal, severance pay, paid annual or sick 
leave…) because of non declaration of the jobs or the employees, casual or short 
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duration jobs, jobs with hours or wages below a specified threshold…place of work 
outside premises of employer’s enterprise (outworkers), jobs for which labour 
regulations are not applied, not enforced, or not complied with for any other reason. 
(ILO, 2003) Informal employment is, therefore, usually defined by the absence of 
social protection (mainly health coverage) or the absence of written contract (but this 
criterion can only be applied to paid employees and is consequently narrower than 
social protection). (ILO, 2003). 
 
From the above definitions, a number of issues are considered in defining the informal 
economy. First, there are conceptual problems associated with studying this sector because of 
the absence of a single definition of informality (Phiri and Nakamba-Kabaso, 2012). As such, 
many terms have been used to refer to the IE and these include: shadow economy, black 
economy or lack economy, grey economy, hidden economy, underground economy, parallel 
sector, second sector, subterranean sector or cash economy (Medina and Schneider, 2018; 
and Phiri and Nakamba-Kabaso, 2012). Second, the concept has shifted from informal sector 
(IS) to informal economy (IE). According to Becker (2004), the informal sector is 
increasingly being referred to as the informal economy to remove the notion in policy 
makers, scholars and all stakeholders that informality is confined to a specific sector of 
economic activity given that it rather cuts across many sectors. Furthermore, “informal 
economy” also emphasises the existence of a continuum from the informal to the formal ends 
of the economy and thus the interdependence between the two sides. The broadened term –
informal economy as opposed to informal sector – took on board considerable diversity of 
workers and economic units, in different sectors of the economy including in informal 
settlements, in townships, in slum dwelling societies, in streets and across rural and urban 
contexts that are particularly vulnerable and insecure. Thus this study adopts informal 
economy as opposed to the narrow informal sector. Third, the various schools of thought with 
regards to the informal economy also shape the way the sector is viewed. Lastly, the 
heterogeneity character of the informal economy has resulted in various definitions 
elaborated as Phiri and Nakamba-Kabaso succinctly said “Any study’s definition of the 
informal sector will depend on its focus” (2012:9). Harding and Jenkins (1989) indicated that 
the literature on the informal sector is fraught with terminological confusion. 
 
1.1.1 Views on the informal economy  
 
Since ILO’s pioneering work on informality began in Africa with the Kenyan 
multidisciplinary mission in 1972, a number of views have been proffered with regards to 
how the sector is seen. Whilst Chen et al (2002) articulated three main schools of thought 
regarding the relationship between the formal and informal economies, a fourth school of 
thought in the name of underground economy approach has been added. First are the dualists 
who claim that the informal economy is a separate marginal economy not directly linked to 
the formal economy, providing income or a safety net for the poor (ILO 1972). Second are 
the structuralists who argue that the informal economy is subordinated to the formal 
economy. According to this school, in order to reduce costs, privileged capitalists seek to 
subordinate petty producers and traders (Castells and Portes 1989). Third are the legalists 
who posit that the informal work arrangements are a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs 
to over-regulation by government bureaucracies (de Soto, 2000). Lastly, are the “Portes or 
underground economy” scholars who emphasis ‘downgraded labour’. For them, they argue 
that downgraded labour receive lower wages, fewer benefits and normally experience inferior 
working conditions compared to individuals employed in the formal economy,  
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The above views clearly show existence of diverse interdependencies between the informal 
and the formal economies. According to Amin (2002), market links exist through the trade of 
raw materials, goods, tools and equipment as well as in the acquisitions of skills and know-
how. Participants in the informal economy provide services to formal economy on a sub-
contracting basis. Furthermore, economic actors can participate both in the formal and the 
informal economies. Table A1 in Annex provides two broad views categorized into ‘old’ and 
‘new’ with regards to the informal economy. According to Table 1, and using example of 
enterprises, the border between informality and informality is not strict and is blurred.  
 
Table 1: A typology of enterprise informality 
Informal economy 
                                                                        
Formal economy  
        
Features A B C D 
 Subsistence 
enterprises 
Micro enterprises 
and small businesses 
Small and medium 
businesses 
Small, medium, and 
large businesses 
Degree of 
informality 
Totally informal High proportion of 
sales undeclared and 
workers not registered 
Some proportion of 
sales undeclared 
and workers 
unregistered 
Labour and firms 
registered 
and regulated 
Type of activity Street traders, 
cottage/micro 
enterprises, 
subsistence farmers 
Small manufacturers, 
service providers, 
distributors, 
contractors 
Small and medium 
manufacturers, 
service providers 
Range of manufacturing 
and services 
Technology Labour intensive Mostly labour 
intensive 
Mixed labour and 
capital intensive 
Knowledge and capital 
intensive 
Owner profile Poor, low education, 
low level of skills  
Poor and non-poor, 
likely educated, 
skilled 
Non-poor, well 
educated, high 
levels 
of skills 
Non-poor, highly 
educated, 
sophisticated level of 
skills 
Markets Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, 
high product 
homogeneity 
Low barriers to entry, 
highly 
competitive, some 
product 
differentiation 
Some barriers to 
entry, established 
markets 
Significant barriers to 
entry, established 
market/ product 
niche 
Finance needs Working capital Working capital, 
some investment 
capital, supplier credit 
Investment capital 
and working 
capital, letters of 
credit, supplier 
credit 
Investment capital and 
working 
capital, letters of credit, 
supplier credit 
Other needs Personal insurance, 
social protection, 
security  
Personal and business 
insurance and 
business support 
services, security 
Personal and 
business insurance, 
business 
development 
services 
Personal and business 
insurance, business 
development services 
Tax status Earnings can be 
below minimum tax 
threshold, no 
recordkeeping, cash 
transactions  
Liable for tax, 
difficult to identify 
and 
assess, poor or no 
recordkeeping, 
cash transactions 
Liable for tax, 
under-report 
earnings, 
use loopholes, 
escape formal tax 
assessments 
Taxed under formal tax 
assessment 
Tax design desired 
features  
No tax liabilities Low rates to 
encourage 
registration, 
minimal compliance 
costs, low 
administration costs 
Higher rates to 
encourage 
graduation 
into formal regime 
 
Source: Joshi et al (2014: 1328) 
Notes: Greyscale or italized text comprises features less relevant to taxation 
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1.1.2 Various definitions of informal economy  
 
As already alluded to, the heterogeneous character of the informal economy has resulted in 
numerous definitions, which among others, shows the perspectives from which the informal 
economy can be viewed. Box 1 shows examples of classification of the informal economy 
and this nomenclature influences the various definitions of the informal economy. For 
examples of criteria used to define the informal economy (see Table A2 in Annex ). These 
various definitions have a bearing when it comes to measuring informal economy activities in 
any country as well as the tax and revenue potential of the IE. 
 
Box 1: Examples of classification of the informal economy: 
 From a labour categories/employment status perspective.  
 From an industrial classification perspective (trade, services, manufacturing, 
construction and transportation).  
 From a rural/urban divide (rural informal sector and urban informal sector.  
 From the standpoint of urban spatial structure: those in the Central Business 
District (CBD) and those in suburban areas. 
 From a location perspective: those who are location-specific and those who are not.  
 From a zoning perspective: those located in proper business locations and those in 
home-based enterprises.  
 According to size classification: 1 persons unit (own-account workers), 2–4 persons 
units (micro enterprises), 5–9 persons units (small scale enterprises).  
 From a migratory status (native, recent migrants and long-term migrants).  
 From the viewpoint of employment quality: normal jobs and misemployment 
(begging, prostitution and scavenging).  
 From the viewpoint of income/employment enhancing potential, which is crucial 
for advancement or upward mobility: enterprises/work with growing market demand 
that reflects high-income elasticity of demand and those with low-income elasticity of 
demand (rickshaw services). Alternatively denoted dynamic/modern informal sector 
and marginal/survivalist groups. 
Source: Amin (2002)   
 
 
i. Definition by activities (economic units/enterprises)  
 
The most traditional definition of the informal economy is definition by activities (economic 
units/ enterprises). According to this definition, informal activities are characterized as such 
because they rarely comply with all the regulations that apply to their trade, for example 
concerning registration, tax payment, conditions of employment and operating licenses. 
Furthermore, these activities and or their owners have limited capital resources, they 
normally raise necessary finance at their own risk, they don’t have accounting systems in 
place and they rarely engage in transactions, enter into contracts or incur liabilities. 
 
The International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) of 1993 elaborated a definition 
based on production units rather than on employment relations:  
 
“Units engaged in the production of goods and services with the primary objective of 
generating employment and incomes to the persons involved. These units typically 
operate at a low level of organisation, with little or no division between labour and 
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capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations – where they 
exist – are based mostly on casual employment, kinship or personal and social 
relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.”  
 
One of the main weakness of the ICLS definition is that it concentrates on enterprises, thus 
leaving out on a plethora of informal wage work arrangements and does not capture all 
dimensions of informal employment.  
 
ii. Definition by employment categories  
 
This definition considers informal employment as all remunerative work, both self-
employment and wage employment that is not recognised, regulated, or protected by existing 
legal or regulatory frameworks as well as non-remunerative work undertaken in an income-
producing enterprise. The following are some of the major employment categories used to 
describe the informal economy according to this definition.  
 
a) Self-employed, i.e. own-account workers, heads of family businesses and unpaid 
family workers;   
 
b) Wage workers, i.e. employees of informal enterprises, casual workers without a fixed 
employer, home workers, paid domestic workers, temporary and part-time workers 
and unregistered workers.  
 
c) Employers, i.e. owners and owner operators of informal enterprises. 
 
 
iii. Definition based on the location of informal economy actors  
 
This definition is based on a description of the location within which these actors operate. 
The major location categories as presented by Becker (2004) include:  
 
1. Home-based workers:  
 
a) Dependent home-based workers which:  
 Work at home outside the establishment that buys their product;  
 Agree by prior arrangements to supply goods or services to a particular 
enterprise;  
 Get remunerated through what is paid for their products;  
 Do not employ workers on a regular basis.  
 
b) Independent home-based workers are those who work in their home and deliver 
their products or services to prospective buyers. Their characteristics are those of 
the self-employed and are classified as part of the “account workers”.  
 
2. Street traders and street vendors.  
3. Itinerant, seasonal or temporary job workers on building sites or road works.  
4. Those in between the streets and home, e.g. waste collectors. 
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iv. Definition by income and employment enhancing potential  
 
The fact that the informal economy is heterogeneous with regards to technology in use, 
capital invested, types of management practices, productivity levels and net earnings, implies 
that players are also composed of a heterogeneous group with different reasons for joining the 
informal economy. On one end of the continuum of the informal economy are small-scale 
modern manufacturing and service enterprises, while street vendors, shoe shiners, junk 
collectors and domestic servants, among others constitute those at the other end of the 
spectrum, with a range of service providers in between.  The main segments include: 
 
1. Enterprises with the potential of becoming a significant contributor to the national 
economy and that take up informal economic activities because of their potential for 
generating growth or wealth. What attracts some is the fact that informal activities are 
thought to be unregulated and untaxed and, therefore, to have the potential for 
autonomy and profits (ILO, 2002).    
 
2. Individuals or households who take up informal activities for survival purposes. The 
factors that may attract them are the relative ease of entry, reliance on local resources 
and a minimum of capital investments. Informal activities also allow disadvantaged 
individuals or households to maximise their only asset: labour. This group operates 
informally either because the costs of formalising the activities are too high or 
because the procedures for registration are too complicated and time-consuming.  
 
3. Individuals that devote part-time to informal activities while working elsewhere. For 
instance, some government employees in both Asia and Africa, because of low and 
irregular salaries, have alternative incomes to secure their living. 
 
2 Causes of the informality in SSA 
 
The fact that there is still no consensus on the definition of second economy has resulted in 
corresponding multitude of possible factors advanced as causes of this economy 
(Makochekanwa, 2012b). Medina and Schneider (2018) contends that the size of the informal 
economy depends on various elements.  Thus, literature on the subject matter has advanced 
multiple reasons as the major causes behind the existence and growth of the second economy. 
Table 2 provides some of the reasons which caused the growth of the second economy in the 
case of Zimbabwe over the years. 
 
Table 2: The main causes/indicators determining existence and growth informal economy 
 Causal/indica
tor variable  
Theoretical reasoning or intuition  
 
References  
 
 
 
1 
 
Tax and 
social security 
contribution 
burdens  
 
The distortion of the overall tax burden affects labour-
leisure choices and may stimulate labour supply in the 
informal economy. The bigger the difference between the 
total labour cost in the official economy and after-tax 
earnings (from work), the greater the incentive to reduce 
the tax wedge and work in the shadow economy. This tax 
wedge depends on social security burden/payments and 
the overall tax burden, making them key determinants in 
the existence of the shadow economy.  
Thomas (1992), Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (1998a,b), Giles 
(1999a), Tanzi (1999), 
Schneider (2003, 2005), 
Dell’Anno (2007), 
Dell’Anno, Gomez-
Antonio and Alanon 
Pardo (2007)  
  
The greater the number of unemployed, the more will be Ahn and De la Rica 
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2 
 
High 
Unemployme
nt  
 
individuals willing to find a job in the informal economy  (1977); Alanon and 
Gomez-Antonio (2005);  
Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Williams and 
Schneider (2016)  
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Restrictive  
regulatory 
environment  
Excessive degree of regulations forces individuals to 
undertake certain activities within the scope of informal 
economy. Regulations, for example labour market 
regulations or trade barriers, are another important factor 
that reduces freedom (of choice) for individuals in the 
official economy. They lead to a substantial increase in 
labour costs in the official economy and thus provide 
another incentive to work in the shadow economy: 
countries that are more heavily regulated tend to have a 
higher share of the shadow economy in total GDP. 
Especially the enforcement and not the overall extent of 
regulation – mostly not enforced – is the key factor for the 
burden levied on firms and individuals, inducing them to 
operate in the shadow economy.  
Alanon and Gomez-
Antonio (2005). Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Shleifer 
(1997), Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (1998b), 
Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (2000), Kucera 
and Roncolato (2008), 
Schneider (2011), Hassan 
and Schneider (2016)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Quality of 
institutions or 
corruption  
 
The quality of public institutions is another key factor in 
the development of the informal sector. In particular, the 
efficient and discretionary application of the tax code and 
regulations by the government plays a crucial role in the 
decision to work off the books, even more important than 
the actual burden of taxes and regulations. A bureaucracy 
with highly corrupt government officials tends to be 
associated with larger unofficial activity, while good rule 
of law through securing property rights and contract 
enforceability increases the benefits of being formal. A 
certain level of taxation, mostly spent in productive public 
services, characterizes efficient policies. In fact, 
production in the formal sector benefits from higher 
provision of productive public services and is negatively 
affected by taxation, while the shadow economy reacts in 
the opposite way. An informal sector developing as a 
consequence of the failure of political institutions to 
promote an efficient market economy, and entrepreneurs 
going underground due to inefficient public goods 
provision, may reduce if institutions can be strengthened 
and fiscal policy moves closer to the median voter’s 
preferences.  
Johnson et al. (1998a,b), 
Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (2000), Dreher 
and Schneider (2009), 
Dreher, Kotsogiannis and 
McCorriston (2009), 
Schneider (2010), 
Teobaldelli (2011), 
Teobaldelli and Schneider 
(2012), Amendola and 
Dell’Anno (2010), Losby 
et al. (2002), Schneider 
and Williams (2013), 
Hassan and Schneider 
(2016), Williams and 
Schneider (2016)  
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Public sector 
services  
 
An increase in the shadow economy may lead to fewer 
state revenues, which in turn reduces the quality and 
quantity of publicly provided goods and services. 
Ultimately, this may lead to increasing tax rates for firms 
and individuals, although deterioration in the quality of 
public goods (such as public infrastructure) and of the 
administration continues. The consequence is an even 
stronger incentive to participate in the shadow economy. 
Countries with higher tax revenues achieved by lower tax 
rates, fewer laws and regulations, a better rule of law and 
lower corruption levels should thus have smaller shadow 
economies.  
Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Zoido-Lobatón (1998a,b), 
Feld and Schneider 
(2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The efficiency of the public sector also has an indirect 
effect on the size of the shadow economy because it 
affects tax morale. Tax compliance is driven by a 
psychological tax contract that entails rights and 
obligations from taxpayers and citizens on the one hand, 
but also from the state and its tax authorities on the other 
Feld and Frey (2007), 
Kirchler (2007), Torgler 
and Schneider (2009), 
Feld and Larsen (2005, 
2009), Feld and Schneider 
(2010)  
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6 Tax morale  hand. Taxpayers are more inclined to pay their taxes 
honestly if they get valuable public services in exchange. 
However, taxpayers are honest even in cases when the 
benefit principle of taxation does not hold, i.e. for 
redistributive policies, if such political decisions follow 
fair procedures. The treatment of taxpayers by the tax 
authority also plays a role. If taxpayers are treated like 
partners in a (tax) contract instead of subordinates in a 
hierarchical relationship, taxpayers will stick to the 
obligations of the psychological tax contract more easily. 
Hence, (better) tax morale and (stronger) social norms 
may reduce the probability of individuals working in the 
shadow economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deterrence  
 
Despite the strong focus on deterrence in policies fighting 
the shadow economy and the unambiguous insights of the 
traditional economic theory of tax non-compliance, 
surprisingly little is known from empirical studies about 
the effects of deterrence. This is because data on the legal 
background and the frequency of audits are not available 
on an international basis; such data are difficult to collect 
even for OECD countries. Either the legal background is 
quite complicated, differentiating fines and punishment 
according to the severity of the offense and the true 
income of the non-complier, or tax authorities do not 
reveal how intensively auditing is taking place. The little 
empirical survey evidence available demonstrates that 
fines and punishment do not exert a negative influence on 
the shadow economy, while the subjectively perceived risk 
of detection does. However, results are often weak and 
Granger causality tests show that the size of the shadow 
economy can affect deterrence, instead of deterrence 
reducing the shadow economy.  
Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein (1998), 
Pedersen (2003), Feld and 
Larsen (2005, 2009), Feld 
and Schneider (2010)  
8 High level of 
poverty  
If individuals have low disposable income, that is poor, 
they are mostly likely to be willing to do various jobs, 
some of them in the second economy  
Alanon and Gomez-
Antonio (2005); Ocran 
(2009)  
9 Limited 
pursuit by tax 
collectors  
The fact that revenue agencies do not understand fully the 
immense revenue potential of the sector or have limited 
resources cause them not to vigorously pursue tax 
collection in this sector, thus acting as an incentive to 
operate in second economy  
Bagachwa and Naho 
(1995); Chipeta (2002); 
Ocran (2009)  
 
10 
 
High rate of 
return  
With zero direct taxation, high rate of return on second 
economy operations provides an incentive for individuals 
to enter this type of economy  
Bagachwa and Naho 
(1995); Ocran (2009)  
 
 
 
11 
 
High inflation  
 
High inflation implies increased seigniorage or inflation 
tax and this accentuates the effect of taxes upon 
individuals, thus increasing the effective tax burden on tax 
payers. This forces some individuals to go into second 
economy  
Alanon and Gomez-
Antonio (2005); Ocran 
(2007)  
 
 
12 
Foreign 
exchange 
controls  
And 
shortages 
Presence of foreign exchange controls or shortages (e.g., 
foreign currency black market) provides an avenue for 
illegal transfer, foreign exchange contrabandist and 
development of fake statements for import-export 
activities and these are all better done in second economy.  
Dabla-Noris et al (2008) ; 
Hesam (2003)  
 
 
 
13 
 
Development 
of the official 
economy  
The development of the official economy is another key 
factor in the shadow economy. The higher (lower) the 
unemployment quota (GDP growth), the higher the 
incentive to work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.  
Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Feld and 
Schneider (2010)  
 
14 
Self-
employment  
The higher the rate of self-employment, the more activities 
can be performed in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.  
Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Feld and 
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 Schneider (2010)  
 
15 
Size of the 
agricultural 
sector  
The larger the agricultural sector, the more possibilities to 
work in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.  
Hassan and Schneider 
(2016)  
 
16 
Use of cash  The larger the shadow economy, the more cash will be 
used, ceteris paribus. Mostly measured as M0/M1, or 
M1/M2, or cash per capita outside the banking sector.  
 
Hassan and Schneider 
(2016) Williams and 
Schneider (2016)  
 
 
17 
Share of 
labour force  
 
The higher the shadow economy, the lower the official 
labour force participation rate, ceteris paribus.  
 
Schneider and Williams 
(2013), Feld and 
Schneider (2010)  
 
18 
GDP per 
capita 
(economic 
growth) 
A larger shadow economy is associated with more 
economic activities moving out of the formal economy, 
hence, it shows a decrease in economic growth, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
 
 
19 
 
 
Redundancies 
Structural adjustment programmes during the eighties and 
nineties have fuelled the growth of the informal economy 
in developing countries. The disappearance of public 
sector jobs and the closure of uncompetitive businesses 
have forced many laid-off workers to find other ways to 
survive. 
Becker (2004) 
 
Capital is 
favoured over 
labour 
 
Global integration privileges companies who can move 
easily and quickly across borders to the disadvantage of 
workers. The globalisation of the world economy as well 
as global trade and investment patterns thus tends to 
privilege capital and disadvantage labour, especially 
lower-skilled workers that cannot migrate easily or at all. 
Rodrik (1997) 
 
Demand for 
low-cost goods 
and services 
 
The informal economy has been boosted by rural to urban 
migration in conjunction with the demand for low-cost 
goods and services from those employed in the formal and 
informal economies. 
Becker (2004) 
 
Uncommitted 
or unaware 
governments 
 
Many governments are unaware of the economic 
contributions of the informal economy and the problems 
found in it and have therefore found it unnecessary to 
intervene because of the belief that the informal economy 
would die out. The informal economy has often been left 
unattended and has thus had few obstacles for its growth. 
Economic hardship and poverty 
 
Sources: Makochekanwa (2012b:33-34) and Medina and Schneider (2018:34-35) 
 
3 Characteristics of informal economy in SSA 
 
The informal economy is generally considered as the unregulated non-formal portion of the 
market economy that produces goods and services for sale or for other forms of 
remuneration. The term “informal economy” thus refers to all economic activities by workers 
and economic agents that are – in law or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered 
by formal arrangements. The informal economy is largely characterised by:  
 
i. Lowe entry requirements 
 
This sector is normally characterised by low entry requirements in terms of capital and 
professional qualifications. Thus, any person or entity can easily enter and start conducting 
activities, and should there be any challenges, exit is also easy. The low barriers to entry are 
actually an incentive for entry into the informal economy.  
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ii. Private un-incorporated entities  
 
Most entities are private and are not incorporated in terms of being formally registered with 
national registration bodies like registrar of companies etc. In other words, entities are not 
registered under any specific form of national legislation.  
 
iii. Poor accounting and recordkeeping  
 
Given the thin line between personal finances of the owner, and finances of the operating 
entities, most entities in the informal economy tend to either not keep proper books of 
accounts or when they have them, the standard of recordkeeping and bookkeeping will be 
poor. This also makes it difficult for the taxing authorities to measure the level of taxation 
applicable to these entities.  
 
 
iv. Small scale operations 
 
Another important feature characterising informal economy activities in SSA is that their 
production and economic activities are normally of small scale in nature. There are no 
economies of scale to talk about, and in most instances the production and/or product or 
service supplies are not reliable.  
 
v. Employment size below certain threshold  
 
Whilst there is no generally agreed average employment level for informal economy entities 
in Africa, what is however clear is that most entities have employment size below certain 
threshold.  
 
vi. Skills often acquired outside of formal education 
 
Majority of skills that are normally employed by economic agents in this sector are acquired 
outside of formal education system. Some of the skills are acquired either through learning by 
doing or they are inherited from those who started the operations.  
 
 
vii. Labour intensive methods  
 
The level of production and/or service provision vary across the various economic agents, but 
in general the activities are generally labour-intensive. Most methods of production are 
labour intensive, though some participants adapt technology relevant to their line of business. 
 
viii. Lower product/service quality  
 
The quality of products or services from this sector, is considered as subordinate to similar 
products or services offered by entities in formal economy. Given that most economic agents 
in the informal economy do not subscribe to any quality control mechanisms or 
organizations, their products/services tend to be of lower quality.  
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ix. Part of the goods or services are for sale or barter 
 
For some entities, some part of the goods or services are normally sold, while others are 
exchanged in barter trade (especially with other informal economy entities). 
 
x. Informal employment  
 
The employment relationship, in law or in practice is not subjected to: 
 
 Labour legislation (or law) 
 Income taxation 
 Social protection, or  
 Entitlement to certain employment benefits  
 
Informal employment also exists even outside the informal economy. In other words, the 
informal economy consists of both the informal economy and informal employment outside 
the informal economy! 
 
4 Size of informal economy in Africa  
 
Estimating the size of the informal economy is problematic, although there are internationally 
defined measurement methods to define the size and contribution of the informal economy to 
national accounts (Becker, 2004). Practically, mapping the informal economy so as to 
comprehend its size, composition and evolution is a difficult and inevitably imprecise 
exercise (ILO, 2002b). It is also difficult to make international comparisons as different 
definitions are used. Furthermore, within different countries, the informal economy is highly 
segmented by location of work, sector of the economy and status of employment and, across 
these segments, by social group and gender (ILO, 2002c).  
 
Another dimension of challenges relates to the fact that data on the informal sector (excluding 
agriculture) is often compared to data on the total workforce (including agriculture), resulting 
in an under-estimation of the significance of the informal sector. The informal economy is 
therefore not necessarily adequately reflected in the national accounts. Consequently, the use 
of for instance the gross domestic product (GDP) as a measurement for economic 
development does not always reflect the actual situation in a country. Despite these facts, 
some generalisations can be made on a regional basis. 
 
4.1 Approaches to measure the size of the informal economy  
 
There are various methodologies that are used to measure the size of the informal economy. 
These approaches can be divided into direct, indirect or model approaches (Mdeina and 
Schneider, 2018; Becker, 2004 and Makochekanwa, 2012b). According to Tanzi (1982), the 
size of the informal economy can be quantified in three different ways. Firstly, speculation by 
various interest groups and institutions can be used to quantify this sector with the aim of 
increasing the awareness that the phenomenon exists and that it should be taken on board in 
government decision making. Secondly, educated guesses can advance contribution figures, 
though these figures will in most cases not be well defined and maybe incomparable to other 
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statistics. Lastly, there are well-defined, unambiguous approaches which make it easier for 
comparisons to be made between different time periods or between the second economies of 
different countries (Saunders and Loots, 2005). According to literature, and as already 
presented, these well-defined approaches can be categorized into direct approach, indirect 
approach and the model approach.   
 
 
a) Direct approaches     
 
The direct approach relies on well-designed surveys and samples which will normally be 
based on tax audits and voluntary responses, among other sources of data (Schneider and 
Enste, 2003). The surveys usually provide point estimates hence they are useful in estimating 
changes in the size of the second economy. Nevertheless, the surveys are normally unable to 
cover all sections of a given population and as such the outcomes may only provide lower 
bounds of the possible size of a given informal economy. In summary there are generally four 
direct methods that are used to measure the size of informal economy in any country and 
these are: 
 
i. Measurement by the System of National Accounts Statistics – Discrepancy method;  
ii. Representative survey technique approach;  
iii. The use of surveys of company managers; and  
iv. The estimation of the consumption-income-gap of households 
 
 
b) Indirect approaches to measuring the size of the informal economy   
 
The indirect approaches are normally referred to as indicator approaches and they use 
secondary data sources to (indirectly) estimate the size of the informal economy (Saunders 
and Loots, 2005). These approaches are mostly macroeconomic in character and tend to use 
indicators that contain information about how the unrecorded economy evolves over time 
(Ocran, 2009). The main assumption underpinning this approach is that the indicators have 
traces of the development of the informal economy that can be used in estimation. The most 
popular indicators that can act as indicators of the size of the informal economy include the 
following: 
 
i. Discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics approach  
ii. Discrepancy between official and actual labour force approach  
iii. Electricity consumption approach 
iv. Transaction approach 
v. Monetary approach (which has two sub-components namely the (a) The Guttmann 
method and (b) The Fiege method 
vi. Currency demand approach (CDA) 
vii. Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach 
 
 
c) Model approach 
 
The model approach is based on the assumption that the informal economy can be seen as an  
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unobservable variable which is influenced by a variety of causes (tax burden, regulation and 
high transaction costs etc.). This model thus examines a number of exogenous and 
endogenous variables that lead to the existence and growth of the second economy over time, 
and in the process, infers the size of the second economy over time (Giles 1999a, and Frey 
and Schneider, 2000).   
 
4.2 Informal economy contribution to GDP as a measure of size  
 
A number of studies and estimates have been done over the years using the above 
methodologies. Whilst the size of informal economy can be measured in a variety of ways, 
literature has mostly concentrated on its measurement with relation to GDP given the easily 
availability of objective data. Other studies also measure size of IE by inferring from 
employment levels. This study will present the estimated size of SSA countries using its 
contribution to GDP. Table 3, which has been extracted from Medina and Schneider (2018), 
shows size of informal economy for 49 African countries for which figures were available 
and this covers the period from 1991 through to 2015.  
 
Tabulated figures show that the size of the informal economy in Africa in terms of its 
contribution to GDP has declined from an average of 42% of total GDP in 1991 to 35% of 
total GDP by end of 2015. Looking at individual countries, Zimbabwe is the country with 
highest level of informality with informal economy contributing on average 61% towards the 
country’s GDP. Informal economy activities for Zimbabwe have actually grown from 
contribution 57% towards annual GDP in 1991 to 67% of GDP in 2015. Nigeria is the second 
ranked country with high informality averaging 57% of the country’s GDP though growth in 
this sector has declined from contributing 57% of the country’s GDP in 1991 down to 52% of 
the national GDP in 2015. On the other extreme, Mauritius is the country with least informal 
economy activities which averages 23% towards national GDP. Informal economy activities 
for Mauritius have actually been decreasing from contributing 26% towards the country’s 
GDP in 1991 to 19% of its GDP in 2015. 
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Table 3: Size and development of the informal economy of 158 countries over the period 1991 to 2015   
No. Country  1991 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 2010 11 12 13 14 2015 Ave 
1 Algeria  35 36 38 38 37 38 37 38 36 34 34 32 30 28 25 24 24 24 26 26 27 27 26 26 24 31 
2 Angola  50 48 55 50 52 46 50 49 49 49 46 48 49 47 44 41 37 35 36 37 36 37 36 35 35 44 
3 Benin  59 61 59 57 55 53 53 51 51 50 50 50 53 55 56 56 53 54 57 54 55 54 51 46 48 54 
4 Botswana  34 35 36 36 36 35 33 34 33 33 33 32 31 31 30 28 27 27 28 26 25 24 23 22 24 30 
5 
Burkina 
Faso 43 44 45 45 44 44 42 41 39 41 41 41 39 39 37 36 38 36 36 33 32 31 31 31 30 38 
6 Burundi  27 29 32 32 35 40 39 38 39 40 39 39 40 40 38 36 39 38 38 39 38 37 37 36 36 37 
7 Cape Verde 44 45 47 44 44 40 41 38 38 36 35 36 37 36 35 30 30 29 31 31 30 30 29 29 30 36 
8 Cameroon 35 35 38 35 33 36 34 33 34 33 33 33 32 32 31 30 30 30 33 32 31 31 30 28 29 32 
9 CAR 40 43 44 42 40 42 39 39 41 43 42 40 43 42 42 39 38 39 38 38 37 38 53 56 51 42 
10 Chad 46 46 49 46 46 46 46 44 47 46 45 40 42 35 34 35 36 37 37 34 35 34 34 31 29 40 
11 Comoros 40 36 36 40 40 42 41 43 43 40 39 39 38 39 38 37 38 39 40 39 39 39 37 36 41 39 
12 
Congo 
Republic 50 51 53 52 49 48 51 53 52 48 48 48 47 46 45 42 46 43 41 36 36 37 36 33 35 45 
13 
Cote 
d’Ívoire 46 48 48 45 41 39 43 40 42 43 44 44 46 46 45 44 44 44 43 42 44 43 41 39 42 43 
14 DRC 48 49 49 46 46 46 48 48 47 48 48 48 46 47 47 47 45 44 46 44 45 46 46 41 47 46 
15 Egypt  36 36 37 37 37 35 36 35 36 35 35 36 35 34 33 33 31 29 30 31 33 34 34 35 33 34 
16 
Equatorial 
Guinea 38 38 38 37 36 33 33 33 33 33 31 32 31 30 30 29 28 27 28 29 28 29 30 32 31 32 
17 Eritrea  38 49 44 37 39 34 31 34 38 40 36 36 40 39 40 41 42 46 44 45 41 37 38 36 37 39 
18 Ethiopia  38 38 37 38 38 36 36 38 40 40 38 39 39 37 36 34 32 32 31 30 28 27 26 24 25 34 
19 Gabon  49 51 48 44 44 44 42 43 49 48 56 56 57 58 55 60 59 60 63 58 55 54 53 53 52 52 
20 Gambia  51 49 49 54 57 55 54 52 48 45 42 52 43 39 46 48 48 45 40 35 49 43 41 44 44 47 
21 Ghana 46 46 48 46 45 47 45 46 45 42 43 43 43 43 43 42 42 41 41 40 41 41 39 39 39 43 
22 Guinea  41 41 41 42 42 42 41 40 40 40 39 38 39 39 38 37 38 39 42 44 40 38 38 38 42 40 
23 
Guinea 
Bissau  31 31 32 31 31 28 22 43 38 40 40 42 42 42 40 40 39 39 39 38 34 39 39 39 35 36 
24 Kenya  35 35 32 32 32 34 35 36 35 34 34 35 36 35 33 32 33 33 34 32 30 30 30 29 33 33 
25 Lesotho  35 35 36 34 35 33 35 32 33 31 32 30 31 31 32 31 30 29 30 29 28 28 27 25 32 31 
26 Liberia  42 44 45 45 46 47 45 46 45 43 42 42 43 41 42 40 43 43 43 42 42 42 42 42 44 43 
27 Libya  34 36 36 35 35 36 36 38 36 35 36 35 32 31 30 28 27 26 28 27 39 33 35 38 38 34 
28 Madagascar  40 41 41 41 41 44 42 42 40 40 41 47 45 40 41 41 43 39 43 45 45 44 46 45 45 43 
29 Malawi  39 40 40 44 39 40 40 39 38 40 40 42 39 39 39 39 37 37 38 36 37 36 35 34 34 39 
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30 Mali  44 45 45 43 43 43 41 45 42 42 40 40 38 41 39 36 37 35 37 33 34 31 31 31 29 39 
31 Mauritania  36 37 35 36 33 32 36 36 36 36 37 39 38 37 33 28 28 29 30 28 27 25 24 24 26 32 
32 Mauritius  26 26 26 26 26 25 24 23 24 23 22 22 23 23 23 22 21 19 21 21 20 19 20 20 19 23 
33 Morocco  37 38 40 39 40 36 39 36 37 36 36 35 35 34 34 32 31 29 31 29 29 30 30 29 27 34 
34 Mozambique  43 45 45 47 42 41 41 41 40 40 39 37 37 36 35 34 34 33 33 32 31 30 31 32 31 37 
35 Namibia  32 32 32 32 32 32 32 31 32 31 31 29 29 29 28 26 25 24 25 25 23 23 23 22 22 28 
36 Niger  39 43 43 42 41 40 41 39 42 42 40 40 42 43 42 41 41 39 39 36 37 36 35 36 34 40 
37 Nigeria  57 58 59 67 62 61 61 62 60 58 58 60 57 57 56 52 55 53 54 53 52 52 52 51 52 57 
38 
Papua New 
Guinea  42 39 34 32 34 31 35 34 35 36 36 37 37 36 38 37 35 35 34 32 28 27 26 23 35 34 
39 Rwanda  40 40 40 40 41 42 39 40 41 40 41 39 39 36 39 38 35 33 32 32 30 28 28 27 28 36 
40 Senegal  53 52 53 52 50 53 52 47 46 45 44 41 42 40 38 40 37 36 39 38 40 38 37 36 34 43 
41 Sierra Leone 38 42 43 44 45 46 47 46 48 49 50 48 45 44 43 43 41 41 41 39 36 32 26 26 34 41 
42 South Africa  30 31 31 30 28 29 29 29 29 28 28 28 28 27 25 21 22 20 23 23 22 22 21 21 22 26 
43 Swaziland 44 43 44 44 41 41 44 43 43 41 40 38 38 39 39 38 38 38 38 39 40 36 36 35 41 40 
44 Tanzania  60 60 58 57 55 55 56 58 58 58 57 55 54 53 51 54 49 47 49 47 44 44 44 40 39 52 
45 Togo 38 41 51 43 40 37 32 35 35 35 38 38 37 38 39 38 37 38 38 36 35 35 34 34 31 37 
46 Tunisia  42 40 40 39 39 39 39 40 38 38 36 38 37 34 34 31 29 27 29 28 34 32 33 33 31 35 
47 Uganda  42 42 43 43 41 41 42 42 41 43 42 43 42 40 39 38 36 34 35 35 35 32 32 33 32 39 
48 Zambia  54 51 51 51 51 52 52 52 50 49 49 48 48 48 49 49 46 43 42 34 37 33 31 31 33 45 
49 Zimbabwe  57 62 59 56 57 54 56 52 56 59 56 58 62 64 63 61 60 62 69 66 64 64 65 66 67 61 
 Average 42 42 43 42 42 41 41 41 41 41 40 41 40 40 39 38 37 37 38 36 36 35 35 35 35   
Source: Medina and Schneider (2018:61-76)  
Key: CAR = Central African Republic; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo  
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4.3 Informal economy contribution to employment as a measure of size  
 
Informal work as a source of employment in Africa is estimated to have accounted for almost 
80% of non-agricultural jobs, over 60% of urban employment and over 90% of new jobs 
(WIEGO, 2002). With regards to women, the informal economy represents 92% of the total 
job opportunities outside of agriculture (against 71% for men). Almost 95% of these jobs are 
performed by women as self-employed or own-account workers, and only 5% as paid 
employees. According to ILO (2002b), in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, street vending 
predominates in much of the informal economy. 
 
5 Tax and revenue potential of the informal economy  
 
The formalization of informal economy activities, which is hinged among others on taxation, 
has received widespread attention from scholars, tax practitioners, development partners and 
governments (Joshi et al., 2014). The renewed attention to the taxation of the informal 
economy is grounded in its potential importance to revenue, growth, and governance. When 
considering revenue potential, existence of a large informal economy in any country renders 
it very laborious and difficult, especially for developing countries’ governments to finance 
sustainable development from broad-based taxation. Formalization of informal economy 
activities has the potential of bringing more taxpayers into the tax net because firms that wish 
to benefit from the formal economy (for example, through better access to finance) eventually 
become more visible to the tax authorities (Besley and Persson, 2014). Bringing informal 
activities into the tax net is also linked to the overall notion of improved domestic revenue 
mobilisation, which is a core topic of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) (UN, 2015) 
and also speaks well to UN’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17.11. With regards to 
growth, formalization has capability of enhancing improved productivity of small informal 
firms, which are frequently thought to be less efficient than formal ones (La Porta and 
Shleifer, 2014). Taxation of the informal economy is also integrally linked to good 
governance, given that quasi-voluntary compliance and tax morale are driven by 
governmental accountability and responsiveness (Joshi et al., 2014). 
 
i. Revenue and equity implications  
 
Combination of a large number of potential taxpayers in the informal economy, and the 
difficulties of monitoring “hidden” entrepreneurs and small-scale firms, results in serious 
revenue collection costs for tax authorities in developing countries. Simultaneously, the 
revenue potential of taxpayers in the informal economy is fairly modest, as their taxable 
incomes are usually quite low (Joshi et al., 2014) given that some informal economy 
activities are often located in remote rural areas where basic infrastructure like roads etc are 
near non-existence let alone tax collection infrastructure, or come from self-employed sellers 
living near the subsistence level (La Porta & Shleifer, 2014). In this setup, individual incomes 
within the informal sector are low, and tax rates correspondingly low, while the costs of 
collection are very high, owing to the large number of individual firms and the difficulty of 
monitoring them. Resultantly, given the low “value for money” in revenue terms, tax 
                                                            
1
 “Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries, 
to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection.”  
(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17) 
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administrations have often given little priority to the taxation of the informal economy firms 
(Fjeldstad, 2014), which can also be related to equity consideration, namely that taxation falls 
more strongly on the shoulders of low income informal firms (Joshi et al., 2014).  
 
Taxing economic activities of the informal economy also raises equity concerns, given that 
most economic agents in this sector are frequently low income and taxation of such entities is 
potentially regressive (for example, Pimhidzai & Fox, 2012). If efforts to tax the informal 
economy also increase the risk of relatively coercive or corrupt behaviour by tax officials (as 
is often the case), these concerns are exacerbated. For these reasons, many tax experts have 
been skeptical of focusing scarce resources in developing countries on taxing small informal 
sector firms (Keen, 2012, pp. 19–21, 30–32). 
 
The revenue and equity arguments for expanding informal economy taxation is premised on a 
number of reasons. First, is the argument that taxation of small firms in the informal 
economy, though yielding little revenue in the short term, helps to bring firms into the tax 
net, thus ensuring higher tax compliance if they expand over time. In other words, it is a 
matter of building a culture of tax compliance. Second, and a related argument explains the 
standard equity argument in reverse, suggesting that the failure of informal firms to pay taxes 
can be viewed by formal firms as being ‘unfair’. This can lower general tax morale and 
discourage tax compliance among larger firms (Alm et al., 2003; Terkper, 2003; Torgler, 
2003, 2005). Lastly, arguments are advanced to the effect that that formalization may 
increase equity by offering small firms a measure of predictability and protection from 
arbitrary state and related racketeering action. 
 
ii. Growth implications 
 
The concern for tax experts and practitioners is that increased taxation of small firms may 
ultimately hinder growth, and that this cost may far outweigh the purported expected long-
term revenue benefit. The reasoning is that small firms opt into informality precisely because 
they believe that informality will benefit them, given the burdens of formality. However, 
other scholars contend that formalization – of which entry into the tax net is a central 
component – may, in fact, have significant benefits for growth, or, at the very least, may not 
hinder growth (Kenyon & Kapaz, 2005). While informality helps firms avoid certain costs, it 
may also preclude access to certain opportunities available to formal firms, including greater 
access to credit, increased opportunities to engage with large firms and government contracts, 
reduced harassment by police and municipal officials, and access to broader training and 
support programmes. Much of the early evidence that formalization may lead to more rapid 
growth came from evidence that formal firms tend to grow faster than informal sector firms. 
However, such studies leave open the question of causality: do firms grow faster because 
they are formal, or do firms with greater growth prospects formalize. The debate about 
formalization is further complicated by the fact that some small businesses asserts that the 
benefits of formalization, though real, are not high enough or exclusive enough to be an 
incentive to formalize. The fact that business owners in informal economy activities have 
different underlying when compared to larger firms provides another complication. For 
instance, some small businesses are operated by individuals who are not entrepreneurs at 
heart, but are waiting for an opportunity to enter salaried jobs or are running microbusinesses 
in parallel with other employment to supplement income (Maloney, 2004). 
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iii. Governance implications 
 
One of the major motivating factor for taxing the informal economy is the possibility that 
payment of taxes by firms in the informal economy may promote good governance and 
political accountability through three related channels (Joshi et al, 2014). Kundt (2017) point 
out that the line of reasoning is related to an implicit “fiscal contract” between taxpayers and 
the state, which is based on the principles of accountability, legitimacy and mutual trust, and 
encompasses a social norm of paying taxes. First, in order to encourage quasi-voluntary tax 
compliance, the state may be more responsive and accountable to groups that pay taxes 
(Bates & Lien, 1985; Levi, 1988). Second, individuals are more likely to make demands for 
responsiveness and accountability if they are paying taxes, due to a sense of ownership over 
government activities (Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998, pp. 10–11; Prichard, 2009, 2010a). Third, 
efforts to tax informal sector operators could catalyze collective action and political 
engagement by informal sector associations, providing a foundation for expanded bargaining 
(Joshi and Ayee, 2008; Prichard, 2009). 
 
These possible connections point to the fact that, if pursued in a relatively ‘contractual’ 
manner (Moore, 2008), taxation of the informal economy can enhance political voice among 
relatively marginalized groups. However, while plausible, there are also possible reasons 
skepticism: informal economy entities are generally poorly organized, face collective action 
problems, generally lack political power, and may fear reprisals by the state in response to 
expanded demands. Given these challenges, Meagher and Lindell (2013, p. 67) ask: ‘Does 
taxing informal traders strengthen public accountability, or just create new avenues of 
predation?’ 
 
6 Policy options for taxing the informal economy   
 
There are basically three broad, and not mutually exclusive, categories that can be used to tax 
informal economy activities: (i) taxing indirectly through trade taxes, (ii) expanding the reach 
of major formal sector taxes, and (iii) developing specialized presumptive tax regimes.  
 
6.1 Indirect taxation of the informal economy  
 
The simplest approach of collecting tax from the informal economy is indirectly, that is, by 
taxing the goods and services that it buys and sells. As pointed by Keen (2007), this is mostly 
done through Value Added Tax (VAT), which is not refunded to enterprises that are not 
registered for VAT, and import and export duties. In this context, ‘indirect’ implies that 
entities operating in the informal economy are not themselves registered as taxpayers, but are 
nonetheless taxed by virtue of taxes paid on goods and services higher up and lower down the 
value chain (Joshi et al, 2014). This form of taxation dominates other approaches to taxing 
the informal economy by virtue of the fact that it does not require any active informal 
economy participation in the tax system (such as filing tax returns), and so does not come up 
against the difficulties of high compliance costs or limited capacity in the informal sector. 
The most important source of indirect tax revenue in most SSA countries is VAT, as most 
countries have drifted away from import tariffs to VAT, on the bases that VAT is less 
economically distorting. Alongside being able to tax a wide range of economic activity, an 
important benefit of VAT is that it can create positive incentives for informal sector firms 
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with actual or prospective dealings with formal sector firms to enter the formal tax system in 
order to claim tax credits. Evidence from some African countries shows that despite the shift 
toward VAT, import taxes have remained an important component of developing country tax 
revenue, particularly in low-income countries, even as tax rates have declined in recent 
decades. 
 
6.2 Reliance on existing taxes on formal sector firms  
 
The other option available for taxing informal economy activities is to extend the reach of 
common formal sector taxes through enhanced enforcement and compliance (Bird and 
Casanegra, 1992; Bird and Wallace, 2003; and Terkper, 2003). In this case, additional 
incentives for compliance, for instance, reduced rates or rewards to small firms that maintain 
effective records, can help, though both types of measures can increase the overall 
complexity of the tax system and create incentives for small firms to remain, or appear to 
remain, small (International Tax Dialogue, 2007; Loeprick, 2009). Although, enhancing the 
enforcement of formal sector taxes may be suitable for larger entities operating in the 
informal economy, for very small firms the administrative costs for the government are likely 
to be extremely high and present the risk of harassment and abuse. To this end, a number of 
developing countries have established relatively high thresholds for both VAT and income 
taxes with the aim of excluding smallest and micro businesses, which are instead captured by 
presumptive tax regimes (discussed below).  
 
In some cases, some countries have used withholding taxes which have helped them to 
collect taxes from small firms without raising compliance issues (Keen, 2007). These taxes 
are extremely prevalent in SSA, and make up an appreciable share of total revenue collection 
in some cases, with governments or larger firms withholding taxes on transactions with small 
businesses that may not be tax compliant. Evidence and experience from some African 
countries however suggests that withholding taxes can become administratively burdensome 
in that they result in a high degree of incoherence to the overall system, while requiring 
cooperation from withholding firms, and, most importantly, an effective system for crediting 
those firms from which tax is withheld (IMF, 2011; and James, 2009). Given inconsistent 
evidence on both benefits and costs, making conclusive judgements about the merits of 
withholding taxes is difficult. 
 
6.3 Presumptive taxes  
 
Presumptive taxes have been the darling tax method for taxing informal economy entities for 
most African governments. In general taxing small informal economy entities is hindered by 
two factors: high compliance costs for small taxpayers and high costs of collection for tax 
administrations (Loeprick, 2009). Presumptive taxes resolve these problems by using a 
simplified indicator of the tax base to simplify recordkeeping for firms and estimation of tax 
liabilities by tax collectors. Within this basic structure, their particular design is highly 
variable across countries (Bird & Wallace, 2003). The main variations are the following: 
 
 Permitting a simplification of the generally applicable tax base, such as the use of 
cash rather than accrual accounting. IMF (2011) advocates for this approach, 
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perceiving that ‘the difficulty is not that small traders cannot keep simple accounts – it 
is persuading them to share them’. 
 
 Employing some other financial measure as the tax base rather than net profit or net 
value-added. Loeprick (2009) highlights turnover as a widely-used measure, while 
Sadka and Tanzi (1993) argue for the use of a tax on gross assets.  
 
 Using a non-financial indicator of tax liability, such as floor area or number of 
employees. This is the simplest approach, and allows the estimation of tax liabilities 
by tax collectors even in the absence of accounts, but also has the most obvious 
drawbacks. In their simplest form such taxes may approach a simple business fee. 
 
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
The study analyzed informal economy (IE) in SSA. The research provided insights into 
various possible definitions of IE, elaborated on the major causes and characteristics of this 
sector in Africa. The size of informal economy activities in terms of contribution to GDP and 
employment was also analyzed. Tax and revenue potential from the informal economy 
activities was also investigated.  
 
With regards to size, the informal economy in Africa in terms of its contribution to GDP has 
declined from an average of 42% of total GDP in 1991 to 35% of total GDP by end of 2015. 
At country level, the study found that Zimbabwe was the country with highest level of 
informality with informal economy contributing on average 61% towards the country’s GDP. 
Informal economy activities for Zimbabwe have actually grown from contribution 57% 
towards annual GDP in 1991 to 67% of GDP in 2015. On the other extreme, Mauritius was 
the country with least informal economy activities which averaged 23% towards national 
GDP. Informal economy activities for Mauritius actually decreased from contributing 26% 
towards the country’s GDP in 1991 to 19% of its GDP in 2015. The contribution of informal 
economy work towards employment in Africa was found to be around 80% in terms of non-
agricultural jobs, over 60% of urban employment and over 90% of new jobs.   
 
Given existence of a large informal economy in Africa, the study found evidence of renewed 
attention to the taxation of the informal economy, and that revived interest is grounded in its 
potential importance to revenue, growth, and governance. Formalization of informal 
economy activities has the potential of bringing more taxpayers into the tax net because firms 
that wish to benefit from the formal economy (for example, through better access to finance) 
eventually become more visible to the tax authorities. Bringing informal activities into the tax 
net is also linked to the overall notion of improved domestic revenue mobilization, which is a 
core topic of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) and also speaks well to UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17.1 with regards to growth, formalization has 
capability of enhancing improved productivity of small informal firms, which are frequently 
thought to be less efficient than formal ones (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). Taxation of the 
informal economy is also integrally linked to good governance, given that quasi-voluntary 
compliance and tax morale are driven by governmental accountability and responsiveness 
(Joshi et al., 2014). 
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Going into the future and after taking on board cost and benefit analysis, the paper analyzed 
three possible strategies that can be employed in taxing activities in the informal economy in 
Africa.  These three options are (i) taxing indirectly through trade taxes, (ii) expanding the 
reach of major formal sector taxes, and (iii) developing specialized presumptive tax regimes.  
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Annex 1: Old and new view with regards to informal economy  
The Old View The New View 
The informal sector is the 
traditional economy that will 
wither away and die with 
modern, industrial growth. 
The informal economy is increasing with modern, industrial growth – 
accounting for more than half of the new jobs in Latin America and 80 percent 
of new jobs in Africa. In India, more than 90 percent of the labour force is in it. 
It is a feature of economic transition as well as capitalist industrialization. 
It is only marginally 
productive. 
Virtually everywhere the informal economy is efficient and resilient, creating 
jobs. It is a major provider of employment, goods and services for lower-
income groups. It contributes significantly to GDP. 
It exists separately from the 
formal economy. 
It is linked to the formal economy – it produces for, trades with, distributes for, 
and provides services to the formal economy. 
It represents a reserve pool of 
surplus labour 
Much of the recent rise in informality reflects the decline in formal 
employment associated with structural adjustment and global competition. It 
reflects not only the incapacity of formal firms to absorb labour, but also their 
unwillingness to do so. 
Most of those in the sector are 
entrepreneurs of illegal and 
unregistered enterprises 
seeking to avoid regulation 
and taxation. 
It should not be equated with the criminal or illegal economy. It is made up of 
non-standard wageworkers as well as entrepreneurs and self-employed persons 
producing legal goods and services, albeit through irregular or unregulated 
means. Most entrepreneurs and the self-employed are amenable to, and would 
welcome, efforts to reduce barriers to registration and related transaction costs 
and to increase benefits from regulation. Most non-standard workers would 
also welcome more stable jobs and workers´ rights. 
Work in the informal 
economy is comprised mostly 
of survival activities and thus 
is not a subject for economic 
policy. 
Informal enterprises include not only survival activities but also stable 
enterprises and dynamic growing businesses. All informal enterprises are 
affected by economic policies. 
It is comprised mainly of 
unregistered business 
It is comprised not only of informal enterprises but also of informal jobs, 
including employees of informal firms, casual day labourers, and domestic 
workers as well as industrial outworkers and other non-standard workers in 
both informal and formal firms 
It is comprised mostly of 
street traders and very small-
scale producers. 
It is made up of a wide range of informal arrangements- both” resilient old 
forms” and” emerging new ones” (temporary and part-time jobs plus home-
based work for high tech industries). Its two basic segments are informal 
enterprises and informal jobs. 
It is unregulated. Some informal enterprises-such as street vendors-are highly regulated, so much 
so that regulations are impossible to enforce or comply with and are often not 
clear either to local authorities or to vendors. Regulations become a tool of 
harassment and control, not a way to encourage economic contributions of 
street vendors. On the other hand, the employers of most informal workers 
often seek to avoid complying with labour legislation. 
Because it is unregulated and 
untaxed, many working in the 
informal sector are wealthy. 
Average incomes are lower in the informal economy than in the formal 
economy. A higher percentage of people working in the informal economy are 
micro entrepreneurs who hire others. The poorest are, typically, informal 
wageworkers, especially industrial outworkers. 
To regulate the informal 
economy is unnecessary 
interference with its workings. 
In today’s globalized economy, the active role of government is needed in the 
regulation of economic activities, including the informal economy. Clear rules 
and appropriate legislation are needed to regulate the relationship between 
governments, foreign investors, local enterprises, and the workforce. 
Street traders are to blame for 
crime in the inner sites. 
Criminals are a threat to business interests of both formal and informal 
enterprises. 
It does not contribute to 
economic growth. 
It contributes substantially to the economy and needs to be encouraged and 
facilitated. 
Source: Becker (2004: 52) 
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Table A2: Criteria used to define the informal economy  
Criteria    Political (Legal Aspects) Economic Social 
 
 
 
 
Authors  
Government. 
regulation  
 
illegal 
activities  
 
national 
statistics 
(GNP) 
labor market or status 
of labor (unregul., no 
soc. benef., work 
condit., etc.) 
tax evasion 
or 
unreported. 
income 
activity’s 
size 
(small 
scale of 
operat.) 
professional 
status (self-
empl or 
family 
based) 
activity’s 
regulation 
or 
registration 
national 
statistics 
(GNP 
networks autonomy 
& 
flexibility 
survival 
Hart (1971, 1973)    +   + +     
Intern. Lab. Of.′ 
(ILO) – (1972 on.) 
 
+ 
   
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
  
Feige (1979, 1980) + + +  + +   +    
Breman (1980) _   +  + +   +   
Grossman (1982) + +    +  +  +   
Banerjee (1982)    + +     + + + 
Tanzi (1982, 1989)   +  +    +    
Gershuny (1983) + +   +   +   +  
Beneria (1989) +   + + +  +  + + + 
Castells and Portes 
(1989) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
_ 
Harding and Jenkins 
(1989) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
   
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
Renooy (1990) + + + + + +  + + + + + 
Swaminathan (1991) +   + + + + +   + + 
Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda (1996) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
    
+ 
Commander and 
Tolstopiatenko 
(1997) 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
  
+ 
    
Anderson (1998) + + + + + + + + + + + + 
             
Source: Gërxhan (1999: ix-x) 
Key: (+) refers to the inclusion of the criterion in defining the informal sector. 
(-) refers to the explicit exclusion of the criterion in defining the informal sector; 
